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THE PRICE OF RESOLUTION: 
SWITZERLAND AND THE 
HOLOCAUST VICTIMS 
Mereille Najm 
Introduction 
For half a century following the end of the 
Second World War, restitution to Holocaust 
survivors and the families of victims was an 
issue that was put on the back burner. But it 
made an intense comeback in the 1990s, forc-
ing a reexamination of history that revealed 
many unethical and embarrassing actions by 
the Swiss banking industry. Tensions rose 
quickly between the Swiss banks and public and 
private organizations around the world in sup-
port of the victims. 
Events that occurred during the early and 
mid-1990s brought to light many unresolved 
issues of the Holocaust. The collapse of com-
munism opened doors for Jews in eastern 
Europe who could not voice their opinions while 
living under their communist governments. 
Steven Spielberg's 1993 blockbuster, "Schindler's 
List," reminded and educated the world of the 
atrocities that had occurred during World War 
II. Profits from the award-winning movie helped 
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open the Shoah Foundation, which has video-
taped testimonials of those who witnessed and 
experienced the Holocaust firsthand. 
The opening of the United States National 
Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, 
DC, affirmed the importance of the lessons 
learned from one of the darkest periods in the 
world's history. Since its opening, the USHMM 
has been the most visited museum in the coun-
try. (Weiss) In 1995 Swiss Jewish historian 
Jacque Picard published Switzerland and the 
Jews: 1933-1945. This book provided fresh evi-
dence about the wartime activities of the Swiss 
banks and their dealings with Nazi Germany. 
Most importantly, 1995 also marked the 
50th anniversary of the end of World War II with 
special remembrance events worldwide. At a 
commemorative ceremony held at the Swiss 
Parliament in July, President of the 
Confederation Kaspar Villiger said, "We bear a 
considerable burden of guilt for the treatment of 
Jews by our country." ("Frontline ... ") This was 
the first-ever public apology (or even acknowl-
edgment) on behalf of the Swiss for turning back 
almost all refugees attempting to escape their 
fate during the Holocaust. Villiger also apolo-
gized for the stamping of Jewish passports with 
the letter J, a suggestion made by a Swiss official 
in the 1930s to help identify Jews at the borders. 
(Carpozi, p. 34) Whether or not he had the ben-
efit of hindsight, Villiger's speech was the first of 
many acts by the Swiss to make things right. 
The 50th anniversary also served as a 
reminder that the community of Holocaust sur-
vivors was shrinking. This was probably the 
most significant factor that prompted immedi-
ate action to resolve the issues of the Holocaust. 
As David A. Harris, executive director of the 
American Jewish Committee, said, "There was 
a heightened urgency to complete the unfin-
ished business of the Holocaust. People woke 
up and realized that within a few years there 
would be no one left from that generation." 
(Poling) Harris was speaking mostly of the 
Holocaust survivors still alive who were the 
rightful owners of accounts in Swiss banks that 
had been dormant for far too long. The nature 
of this issue had the potential to shake up the 
Swiss banking industry, and it did just that. 
For decades Switzerland had enjoyed its 
reputation as a neutral safe haven during World 
War II. True, it admitted 50,000 Jewish refugees 
fleeing Hitler's war machine, and its own Jewish 
population of 20,000 was the only one in cen-
tral Europe to remain unharmed. (Carpozi, 
p. 114) The Swiss banking industry provided a 
safe means for Jews to deposit their savings into 
secret numbered accounts. But as more sur-
vivors spoke out in the mid-1990s, accusations 
of wrongdoing by Swiss banks began to emerge, 
casting a dreadful shadow over the entire coun-
try. Dormant accounts and Nazi gold deposited 
in Swiss banks took the spotlight among such 
other issues as stolen artwork, unpaid life insur-
ance policies, forced labor, and Switzerland's 
policy towards refugees during the war. 
Like the issue of dormant accounts, the 
Nazi gold topic did not make headlines until the 
mid-1990s. Hitler's Gold: The Story of Nazi War 
Loot, published in 1989, was the first full schol-
arly account and blew the doors wide open on 
the issue. But according to the author, Arthur 
L. Smith, Jr., it received "virtually no attention 
at the time." (Smith, p. xvii) His explanations 
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for this apathy included "obviously a lack of 
general interest, inadequate exposure, and a 
continued Cold War practice that refused to 
classify certain records." (Smith, p. xvii) All 
these factors were soon to be reversed, follow-
ing several actions by British Foreign Minister 
Malcolm Rifkin d. Rifkind reported that very sig-
nificant amounts of German looted gold were 
never recovered from Switzerland. (Smith, p. 
xvii) According to Smith, this unleashed a 
storm of long-held suspicions that the Swiss 
were still holding (even worse, hiding) a vast 
amount of Nazi gold. 
Holocaust survivors, Jewish organizations, 
and state governments within the United States 
began a seemingly endless campaign against 
the Swiss banks to force accountability. Some 
of the world's best historians, government offi-
cials, and industry leaders were drafted for the 
two major campaigns which would supervise 
the long process of solving the issues at hand: 
what was Switzerland's relationship with Nazi 
Germany during the war, and what remained in 
Swiss banks as dormant accounts left over from 
that period. The bank secrecy law, a trademark 
of Swiss banking for most of the 20th century, 
had to be compromised for the first time ever. 
The results found that Switzerland's financial 
relationship and wartime transactions with 
Germany helped keep the Nazi regime afloat 
and reach its goals, whether intentionally or 
not. And on top of that, some banks still pos-
sessed accounts unclaimed by their owners 
after the war. At the end of the millennium, 
Switzerland had to face these unpleasant issues 
and react in the proper manner. 
Birth of Dormant Accounts 
Germany's National Socialist Party began 
carrying out its anti-Jewish campaign in 1933 
by enacting restrictive economic legislation 
against Germans of Jewish origin. Laws were 
created blocking Jews from having certain jobs, 
boycotting their businesses, and forcing them 
to pay unwarranted taxes. The Nazis also heav-
ily taxed those Jews who sought to leave the 
country and blocked the bank accounts of those 
who remained. In order to leave Germany at 
this time, a Jew had to give up 80 percent of his 
property and savings in return for 250 reichs-
marks, which meant about $100 in 1930s cur-
rency values. (Carpozi, p. 80) 
To protect their assets, these victims began 
transferring money to Swiss banks, which were 
highly regarded because of the Swiss Banking 
Law. German spies suspected what was going on 
and attempted to blackmail some banks to gain 
information on these transactions. To encour-
age Jewish business at this crucial time, the 
banks responded by explicitly introducing bank 
secrecy legislation into the Swiss Banking Law 
in 1934. Originally the law was designed to con-
ceal the identities of customers and to protect 
their economic status from third parties (indi-
viduals or governments). The 1934 legislation 
made it a criminal offense to violate this law. 
Most of the Jews who were successful in deposit-
ing their assets in Swiss banks failed to escape 
the horrors of the Holocaust. According to Swiss 
banking practice, after 10 years of inactivity an 
account is declared "dormant." (Arpagaus) 
Recovering the assets of Holocaust sur-
vivors could and should have taken place imme-
diately after the war, when more survivors were 
alive and more evidence existed to support their 
claims. However, few claims were filed or 
resolved at this time. 
In the aftermath of the war and up to the 
1950s, displaced survivors settled in various 
parts of the world. Some stayed in western 
Europe; others returned to their eastern 
European countries that soon fell behind the 
wrong side of the Iron Curtain. Other survivors, 
mostly Jews, sought out new homelands in the 
United States or Israel. By 1948 Israel had 
absorbed an estimated 500,000 Jewish refugees. 
("Holocaust Reparations") Traumatized by the 
Holocaust, many were eager to start new lives 
and made no attempt to recover their assets. 
Virtually all who returned to their original 
homes found them either completely destroyed 
or inhabited by strangers. Either way, all their 
possessions were gone. 
Very few of the survivors or relatives of vic-
tims attempted to reclaim their bank accounts, 
safety deposit boxes, or life insurance policies of 
family members that perished. When they did, 
they were stymied by red tape. Life insurance 
policies could not be collected without death 
certificates as proof. Accounts and safety deposit 
boxes could not be accessed without bankbooks 
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or deposit slips. Banks and insurance companies 
failed to sympathize with the fact that most of 
these people's personal belongings were lost or 
stolen during the rampage of their homes, and 
that victims of Nazi genocide and concentration 
camps were not furnished with death certifi-
cates. Furthermore, banks charged unaffordable 
rates to process inquiries, most of which turned 
up empty. Survivors living in the Soviet bloc 
countries in eastern Europe were prevented 
from seeking restitution for their property by 
their own governments. 
Holocaust victims in the United States also 
tried unsuccessfully to reclaim their assets. In 
1998 Pennsylvania Treasurer Barbara Hafer 
said, "Survivors and their heirs have made 
repeated attempts to claim what is rightfully 
theirs. They have encountered rigid rules and 
arbitrary legal obstacles that have served only 
to hinder recovery efforts." (Hafer) 
Trail of Nazi Gold1 
To understand the history behind the Nazi 
gold issue, it is necessary to begin before the 
start of World War II. In the aftermath of the 
First World War, Germany was financially dev-
astated. The country's inability to provide 
enough war supplies at the end of World War I 
made the Germans realize that economic self-
sufficiency was required to pursue a successful 
expansionist policy. During the prelude to the 
Second World War, Adolf Hitler needed to secure 
sufficient finances to cover large purchases of 
war materials. German finances alone were not 
going to meet the requirements. In Nazi Gold, 
George Carpozi writes: "Germany's own mone-
tary resources (the Reichsmark) were virtually 
worthless in the world market where Germany 
was obtaining its war supplies." (p. xi) Gold is 
the most readily exchangeable and stable form 
of currency. It is also easily convertible because 
it can be remelted. All Hitler had to do was 
acquire it and turn it into the proper credit. 
The trail of monetary gold looted by the 
Nazis began in 1938 with the annexation of 
Austria and the ceding of the Sudetenland, a pri-
marily German-speaking area of Czechoslovakia. 
In March Hitler liquidated the assets of the 
1All dollar values are wartime figures unless otherwise 
noted. 
Austrian National Bank, amounting to over $100 
million at the time, and transferred them to the 
Reichsbank - the central bank of Germany 
which Hitler took under his control. (Smith, 
p. 2) Most private gold belonging to Austrian cit-
izens was also confiscated. The Germans 
absorbed almost 60 banks in the Sudeten terri-
tory as well.(Smith, p. 5) Fearing that their 
reserves were next, the Czechoslovakian 
National Bank arranged to transfer a large por-
tion to the Bank of England, which quickly fell 
into the hands of the Germans. In all, Hitler 
looted about $44 million from the Czechs. 
(Smith, p. 5) 
France became the safe keeper in a futile 
effort by several European countries that feared 
they were next to be plundered. Anticipating an 
attack by the Germans, the central bank of 
Poland looked to the Bank of France as a safe 
haven for its reserves. In 1938 the bank sent $64 
million on a mission to get to France safely. 
(Smith, p. 8) The money was routed by train 
through Romania, Turkey, and Lebanon where 
it was placed aboard a ship for safe passage to 
France. Luxembourg also entrusted its gold to 
the Bank of France and sent $5 million in 1940, 
the same year in which Belgium transferred 
$223 million. (Smith, pp. 11, 14) The Germans, 
however, quickly defeated the French army in 
June 1940. By October the French could not 
escape the mandate to turn over all gold in their 
possession to Germany as war booty. 
Hitler continued to amass large amounts 
of gold for his reserves. The Dutch surrender to 
Germany in 1940 gave Hitler access to a sub-
stantial gold reserve in the Bank of Amsterdam. 
In all, a total of $163 million in gold was 
deposited in the Reichsbank during the occu-
pation of the Netherlands. Also, over $4 million 
was looted from the Bank of Danzig. (Smith, 
p.lO) When German forces occupied Rome in 
1943, they ordered the Bank of Italy to move its 
$80 million of gold northward to Milan, under 
Mussolini's newly-formed fascist government. 
(Smith, p. 25) Assets liquidated from the Bank 
of Yugoslavia were divided between the 
Germans and Italians. 
By 1942 Hitler had seized over $621 mil-
lion in gold - all the monetary gold available 
to him in the central banks of occupied Europe. 
(Smith, p. 27) Shortly after, another source 
86 
appeared that added to his reserves: the gold 
and valuables stolen from concentration camp 
victims, Jews being transported to Polish ghet-
tos, refugees attempting to cross national 
boundaries, and citizens of occupied countries. 
The German secret police, the SS, made a total 
of 78 deliveries to the Reichsbank which includ-
ed gold and silver coins, wedding rings, watch-
es, other types of jewelry, dental fillings, eye-
glass frames, bank notes, platinum, stamp 
collections, and even some women's hair. 
(Carpozi, p. 51) The sum of the deposits, which 
were kept in an account in the name of SS 
Captain Bruno Melmer, was worth approxi-
mately $146 million. (Carpozi, p. 114) In pres-
ent-day terms, the value of all the gold accu-
mulated by the Nazi government was estimated 
to be $5.6 billion. (Carpozi, p. ix) 
It was vital to the Hitler regime to secure 
cooperation from banks in foreign countries so 
that the gold could be deposited and turned into 
credit for purchasing necessary war goods. A 
number of methods were used to make the loot-
ed gold acceptable to banks in neutral coun-
tries. Many of the small gold items were sent to 
the Prussian State Mint Company for smelting. 
Other gold, including most of the monetary 
gold of occupied countries, was sent to a large 
German industrial plant called Degussa for 
resmelting into gold bars. The bars were 
stamped as property of the Reichsbank to con-
ceal their origin. Predating the bars (to arbi-
trary years before 1939) became a practice to 
further conceal their true identity. Counterfeit 
papers were also furnished to accompany the 
resmelted bars to their destination. (Carpozi) 
The next step was to convert the gold bars 
into credit or currency that could be used to pur-
chase war goods. For this Hitler needed the coop-
eration of neutral European banks. The Allies 
could not force a full blockade on Germany, but 
they pressured the neutral states to curb their 
dealings with the Nazis. However, German influ-
ence on the neutrals was greater than that of the 
Allies. Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Turkey were 
among the countries that had dealings with 
Germany, but Switzerland was at the center of 
the trade. Swiss private banks and the Swiss 
National Bank (SNB) took the cake, as Carpozi 
wrote, being "the recipient of four-fifths of all the 
gold the Nazis looted." (Carpozi, p. 111) 
The Swiss Role 
Switzerland's position during WWII was 
very different from that of the other neutral 
countries. From 1942 until nearly the end of the 
war, the Swiss were completely encircled by the 
Axis powers and were walking a very dangerous 
tightrope. The country's dependence on imports 
and overpopulation severely limited Switzer-
land's options. Even though the Swiss increased 
military expenditures in order to protect them-
selves as soon as Hitler came to power, the 
threat of invasion continued throughout the 
entire war. The Germans devised at least five 
separate plans of attack in 1940, but several fac-
tors were in favor of the Swiss. Foremost, the 
Germans concentrated their efforts on the major 
powers such as Russia. Second, Switzerland was 
prepared to counter an invasion by immediate-
ly destroying its own key tunnels, bridges, roads, 
railways, power stations and airfields, rendering 
it impossible or useless for the Germans to 
attack. For these reasons and the fact that the 
Swiss army declared it would never surrender 
to the Axis, German officials advised Hitler that 
an assault on Switzerland would be long-drawn 
and very costly. Therefore, the Germans never 
attacked. (Halbrook) 
Allowing Switzerland to remain intact was 
in fact advantageous to the German cause. The 
Swiss industry turned out key war materials 
required by the Germans. Alpine transit routes 
through Switzerland were the only means to 
transport goods between Italy and Germany. 
The nature of the Swiss banking industry, com-
bined with the fact that Switzerland had a vir-
tual monopoly over European gold trading, was 
precisely what Hitler needed to financially sup-
port his war machine. In Hitler's Gold, Smith 
writes: "Switzerland eventually became the sin-
gle indispensable state of the five neutrals, the 
only one Germany could not afford to occupy." 
(Smith, p. 48) 
Short -term Swiss-German clearing agree-
ments were signed continuously throughout 
the war, permitting the Reichsbank to sell gold 
and purchase needed currency from Swiss 
banks. Other neutral states ceased to purchase 
gold directly from Germany towards the end of 
the war; but Switzerland continued its prof-
itable trade. Results from the Allied-Swiss nego-
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tiations of 1946 estimate that the Swiss 
National Bank accepted over $398 million of 
Nazi gold, and other Swiss banks took in over 
$64 million worth of gold. (Carpozi, p. 113) In 
current currency values, this would exceed over 
$4.5 billion worth of transactions. 
The role of the Swiss financial institutions 
extends beyond simply trading gold with 
Germany. As a report from the Institute of the 
World Jewish Congress states, "Swiss banks did 
a lucrative business with the German 
Reichsbank and with individual Nazi officials." 
It continues: "Switzerland was the favorite 
haven for Nazi bank accounts and safe deposit 
boxes, which often contained property plun-
dered from Jews." ("Frontline ... ") Even the roy-
alties from Hitler's Me in Kampf found their way 
into a Swiss bank account. In the end, 
Switzerland was Germany's chief banker, mer-
chant, and international transit point through-
out the war. 
How much did the Swiss actually know 
about the origins of the gold being purchased 
from Germany? It was a well-known fact dur-
ing the war that German gold reserves were 
being depleted and that Nazis were robbing 
Europe of whatever resources they found use-
ful to their campaign. Adding to this argument, 
Carpozi writes: "Intelligence reports indicate 
the Swiss were totally aware of the Nazi gold 
heists from central bank reserves of neutral and 
occupied countries."(Carpozi, p. 37) Therefore 
the Swiss National Bank had to defend itself 
against Allied accusations that it had purchased 
looted gold. Bank officials responded that their 
actions were "in good faith," but this response 
did not ease the concerns of the Allies. 
First Steps towards Resolution 
During the war, the Allies began a series 
of broad initiatives warning the neutrals (but 
really directed mainly at the Swiss) not to 
engage in transactions that may involve looted 
gold. In mid-1942, British radio broadcasts pub-
licly criticized the Swiss and other neutrals for 
permitting currency exchange for looted gold. 
Seventeen Allied states signed the "Inter Allied 
Declaration" of 1943, which warned the neu-
trals to halt dealings with Germany, even if 
those dealings appeared to be legal in form. As 
to why the declaration didn't produce any tan-
gible results, Smith concluded that "it was still 
1943 and for the neutrals the Nazi presence 
over Europe outweighed all other considera-
tions." (Smith, p. 64) The Nazis posed a bigger 
threat to the neutrals than did a loosely word-
ed Allied declaration. 
It was imperative that something be done 
to deny Germany access to credit because the 
United States and Great Britain both suspected 
that Nazi officials were reserving some of the 
gold for a postwar haven. An American intelli-
gence project called "Safehaven" pledged to 
uncover these assets. Consequently, the next ini-
tiative by the Allies - the "Gold Declaration" -
was drafted in 1944. In this message, American 
Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau noted: 
"The United States government formally declares 
that it does not and will not recognize the trans-
ference of title to the looted gold which the 
Axis ... has disposed of in world markets." (United 
States, pp. 134-35) The U.K. and USSR both 
made similar statements. 
Unfortunately Allied pressure to curb 
German-Swiss dealings was not successful, con-
sidering that the trade was still active near the 
end of 1944. One reason the Swiss continued 
dealing with Germany was to ensure that the 
Germans would continue selling them vital 
resources, like coal. The Allies needed a stronger 
plan. The answer was from an American dele-
gation headed by Roosevelt assistant Lauchlin 
Currie called the "Currie Mission Statement." 
According to the agreement signed on March 8, 
1945, with the help of France and Britain, Swiss 
authorities agreed to block assets of Axis and 
Axis-controlled nations, to conduct a census of 
German assets in Switzerland, to assist in the 
restoration of looted property, and to stop gold 
purchases from the Reichsbank (unless they 
were to be used to pay for Germany's diplomat-
ic missions in Switzerland, for prisoners of war, 
or for contributions to the Red Cross). However, 
the Swiss did not proceed to honor all these 
commitments. The last transaction between the 
Swiss National Bank and the Reichsbank did not 
take place until April 1945, and did not fall 
under any of the exceptions just noted. 
Stuart Eizenstat, United States Under-
secretary of Commerce for International Trade, 
summed it up very well when he said: 
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"Switzerland ended World War II as one of the 
wealthiest nations in Europe." (Carpozi, p. 34) 
For several months during postwar negotia-
tions, Switzerland maintained an apathetic and 
immoral attitude, refusing to return any Nazi 
gold to those from whom it was plundered and 
denying it had ever received any looted gold. 
Swiss negotiators also claimed that the Allies 
had no legal right to recover and redistribute 
Nazi assets. 
It wasn't until the Washington Accord in 
May 1946 that the Swiss agreed to comply with 
Allied requests. The Allies had an advantageous 
position in the negotiations, partially because 
the United States had frozen all Swiss assets 
under its control. The Swiss committed to liq-
uidate hundreds of millions of dollars in German 
assets and identify dormant accounts that could 
be used to compensate Nazi victims; but these 
parts of the agreement were never fully imple-
mented. However, the Swiss promptly made a 
payment of $58.4 million to the Allied Gold Pool, 
in return for the Allies dropping all claims 
against the Swiss government and the Swiss 
National Bank dealing with Nazi gold. (U.S. and 
Allied Efforts ... ) This payment was earmarked 
as "a voluntary contribution" to ensure the ges-
ture would not be construed as an admission of 
guilt. Although the figure was a severe under-
estimate of what the Allies felt the Swiss were 
holding, America's priorities were to rebuild 
post -war Europe, to create NATO to contain the 
Soviet threat, to put a democratic West 
Germany on its feet, and to deal with security 
concerns involving other neutral countries. It 
took almost half a century for the Washington 
Accord to be seriously challenged. 
The next major event in the World War II 
assets issue occurred in 1962 when a federal 
decree was approved in Switzerland that 
required Swiss banks to identify any dormant 
accounts belonging to foreigners or stateless 
persons persecuted because of race, religion, or 
political beliefs. The structure of this law 
allowed the banks to determine which accounts 
fell under this category; there was no indepen-
dent supervision of the investigation. For exam-
ple, accounts belonging to those living under 
Soviet-controlled countries in eastern Europe 
did not have to be reported, and no efforts were 
made to contact survivors in those countries. 
The banks also argued that businesses could not 
be subjects of racial persecution; therefore 
accounts in the names of corporate entities 
were also not required to be identified. 
Moreover, instead of doing a complete search 
for all dormant accounts, the banks only 
responded to claims submitted by survivors 
who were aware of the existence of their 
accounts. Heirs of accounts with no knowledge 
of their existence were deprived of the chance 
to claim them. Many claims were not submit-
ted because the bureaucracy of the banks was 
so intimidating. Safety deposit boxes, many of 
which held private assets of Holocaust victims, 
were also excluded from the investigation. In 
the end, only 931 of the 7,000 claims resulted 
in accounts being returned to their rightful 
owners. ("Frontline ... ") The banks felt that this 
effort resolved their responsibility on the issue 
of dormant accounts. Except for a small group 
of subsequent claims quietly settled for $5.2 
million in 1972, the Swiss banks were not 
forced to confront the matter again until1995. 
One Last Try 
The latest campaign to settle dormant 
accounts began as one last attempt by a few 
tenacious Holocaust survivors to reclaim their 
assets. Many of them are children of Holocaust 
victims and just recently discovered information 
about their pre-war assets. Backed by legal attor-
neys, miraculous tales of survival, and the will 
to expose the truth, these elderly Jews attempt-
ed to single-handedly get restitution back from 
the banks that they or their parents had invest-
ed in half a century earlier. Although their indi-
vidual efforts were not enough to shake things 
up within the banks, they caused a stir in the 
international news media that strengthened 
public opinion in their favor. Publications like 
the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, and 
Business Week devoted considerable attention 
to their cause. However, a stronger force was 
needed to reckon with these huge banks. It was 
only natural that the leading institution dedi-
cated to Jewish causes- the World Jewish 
Congress -would become involved. 
As early as 1992, leading members of the 
World Jewish Congress (WJC) including 
Secretary General Israel Singer and Executive 
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Director Elan Steinberg began to ask serious 
questions about the fate of Jewish assets after 
the end of World War II. Pinpointing such assets 
appeared to be a simple matter; but Swiss bank 
secrecy laws, coupled with past suppression and 
foot -dragging concerning the issue by the Swiss 
government, made identification difficult. Their 
intense prodding and well-researched efforts, 
along with the work of the WJC President and 
CEO of Seagram's Edgar Bronfman, uncovered 
facts about Switzerland's past that could not be 
ignored. What began as an effort to look at the 
issue of dormant accounts actually revealed the 
need for a broader investigation that included 
Nazi gold, stolen artwork, unclaimed insurance 
policies, and forced labor. 
Bronfman, a billionaire humanitarian 
once called "the most powerful Jew in the 
world," became the voice that represented 
Jewish Holocaust survivors around the world. 
In September 1995, Bronfman and Singer went 
to Bern to meet with President Kaspar Villiger 
and the Swiss Bankers' Association (SBA) to 
address the issue of heirless accounts. In a small 
room with no chairs or furniture, the bankers 
announced they had orchestrated an internal 
audit of their member banks earlier in 1995 and 
found 775 dormant accounts. SBA President 
George Krayer offered Bronfman $32 million to 
close the matter for good. ("Frontline ... ") It was 
no surprise that Bronfman refused his offer. 
Independent researchers and the WJC estimat-
ed the horde of dormant accounts to be worth 
several hundred million dollars. Calling this 
offer "bribery," Bronfman enlisted the help of 
President Bill Clinton and Republican Senator 
Alfonse D'Amato of New York. 
The year 1996 was a pivotal one for the 
Holocaust era assets issue. Throughout the 
spring, the WJC and the offices of Senator 
D'Amato released declassified documents from 
the 1940s that revealed the wartime activities of 
three of Switzerland's largest private banks: 
Swiss Bank Corp, Credit Suisse, and Swiss 
American Corp. These documents verified pre-
vious suspicions that the banks were conducting 
a very lucrative and dubious trade with the Nazis. 
In April 1996, D'Amato announced that the 
Senate banking committee would investigate the 
details of the relationship between the Swiss 
banks and Germany. ("Holocaust Deposits ... ") 
He also lobbied to open up renegotiation of the 
1946 Washington Agreement. Hearings began in 
Congress, and many survivors came forth with 
emotional and shocking testimonies. 
In May 1996 a Memorandum of Under-
standing was signed between the SBA, the WJC, 
and the World Jewish Restitution Organization 
(WJRO). The Memorandum outlined the for-
mation of the Independent Committee of 
Eminent Persons (ICEP). The ICEP, with its 6 
members and chairman Paul Volcker (former 
President of the United States Federal Reserve), 
was established to govern an independent audit 
of Swiss banks. The ICEP's main tasks were to 
search for dormant accounts, trace any Nazi 
loot not returned by the banks after the war, 
and formulate criteria for settling claims. 
Commonly known as the Volcker Committee, 
it appointed three international auditing firms 
(Arthur Andersen, KPMG Peat Marwick, and 
Pricewaterhouse) to conduct the search. For 
the first time since its creation in 1934, the 
bank secrecy law was lifted for a period of five 
years to facilitate the work of the committee. 
The firms were given unfettered access to all 
relevant files in Swiss banking institutions 
regarding accounts and other assets deposited 
between 1933 and 1945. The ICEP initiated its 
investigation of 254 banks existing in 1945, 
merged into 59 banks today. (Levin, p.1) The 
most recognizable banks included the "big 
three" commercial banks: Credit Suisse (CS), 
Swiss Bank Corp (SBC), and Union Bank of 
Switzerland (UBS). It opted out of investigat-
ing 227 small cantonal banks, which only 
encompass 20 percent of the Swiss banking sys-
tem and have very limited ties with foreign cus-
tomers. (Levin, p. 1) 
There were still many unanswered ques-
tions about Switzerland's wartime dealings with 
Nazi Germany that had to be addressed but were 
beyond the scope of the ICEP's responsibilities. 
Therefore, in September 1996 the Independent 
Commission of Experts was set up to thoroughly 
evaluate Switzerland's relationship with 
Germany during World War II. The commission, 
chaired by noted historian and Swiss professor 
Jean-Francois Bergier, was specifically asked to 
address questions about stolen goods, gold 
transactions with the Reichsbank, and Swiss 
refugee policy during the war. Its research 
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extended to banks, insurance agencies, and 
intermediaries (auditors, lawyers, notaries), as 
well as the SNB. Like the Volcker Committee, 
the Bergier Commission was given unlimited 
access to relevant bank documents. 
October 1996 brought with it the first com-
plaint filed in an American court on behalf of 
Holocaust victims. In a federal court in New York 
City, Auschwitz survivor Gizella Weisshaus filed 
a $20 million class-action lawsuit against UBS 
Uoint defendants included SBC, CS and SBA) to 
seek funds from dormant accounts on behalf of 
Holocaust victims. A separate suit was filed in 
the same court later that month: Friedman v. 
Union Bank of Switzerland (SBC and CS were 
joint defendants, and SBA was named co-con-
spirator). ("Switzerland and the ... ") 
In November, one year after the SBA estab-
lished its own special commission to investi-
gate dormant accounts in Swiss banks, 
ombudsman Hanspeter Haeni declared that 
only $9,000 worth of assets had turned up in 
their audit. ("Holocaust Deposits ... ") The enor-
mous gap between what the survivors were 
seeking ($20 billion) and what the banks 
believed they had ($9,000) foreshadowed the 
seemingly endless battle that would have to be 
fought. The two sides were nowhere near a 
mutual understanding, and each side included 
some very angry parties. Soon after Haeni's 
statement, some survivors went so far as to 
press the WJC to launch a boycott of the banks. 
President of the Swiss Confederation Jean-
Pascal Delamuraz compared the Jewish calls for 
restitution to "ransoming and blackmail," 
touching off protests and strengthening threats 
to boycott. ("Chronology ... ") 
A damning blow was dealt to the credibil-
ity of the Swiss bankers when UBS security 
guard Christoph Meili exposed the bank's 
attempted destruction of Nazi-era documents. 
Under the Memorandum of Understanding, all 
banks had agreed to preserve any evidence or 
documents that pertained to transactions dur-
ing World War II. Meili discovered two carts of 
documents waiting to be shredded that includ-
ed wartime records detailing sales of confiscat-
ed properties. Mter informing the police, Meili 
was found guilty of violating banking law and 
was immediately fired. Swiss authorities pur-
sued him until he was granted asylum in the 
United States. ("Switzerland and the ... ") The 
UBS claimed that although the incident was a 
"regrettable mistake," the files contained no 
information that would affect the audit of the 
Volcker Committee. ("Chronology ... ") 
Not much was being accomplished to put 
either side of the Holocaust era assets battle at 
ease. In fact, a heated battle was ensuing. A 
third lawsuit was filed as a class action in 
January 1997, World Council of Orthodox 
Jewish Communities Inc. v. Union Bank of 
Switzerland. It involved the same defendants as 
the first two lawsuits and referred to looted 
assets and slave labor in the complaint. At the 
end of that month, Swiss Ambassador to the 
United States Carlo Jagmetti stated that 
Switzerland and the Jewish organizations were 
"at war" and handed in his resignation the next 
day. ("Switzerland and the ... ") 
Although not much was being accom-
plished legally, several separate efforts were ini-
tiated to aid Holocaust survivors. In February 
1997, the three big banks- CS, SBC, and UBS 
-set up a $200 million Holocaust Humanitarian 
Fund to be distributed to needy victims of the 
Holocaust around the world. Also, the Special 
Fund was created by the Swiss Federal Council 
in addition to the Humanitarian Fund and man-
aged by the WJRO. In March Swiss President 
Arnold Kroller suggested that the citizens of his 
country create a $4.7 billion Solidarity 
Foundation drawn from the SNB's gold reserves 
to finance humanitarian aid to victims of pover-
ty, genocide, war, and natural disasters, includ-
ing Holocaust victims. To this date, the Swiss 
have not voted on whether or not to create the 
Foundation. ("Holocaust Deposits ... ") 
In order for any type of settlement to be 
reached out of court, talks began between 
Jewish organizations and the Swiss banks. U.S. 
Undersecretary of Commerce Stuart Eizenstat 
was chosen by the Clinton Administration to 
mediate the proceedings. In May 1998 he 
released a 200-page report titled U. S. and Allied 
Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other 
Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During 
WWII. According to Eizenstat the report 
addresses "a vital but relatively neglected 
dimension of the history of the Second World 
War and its aftermath." It showed that between 
January 1939 and January 1945 the Reichsbank 
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transferred $400 million (almost $4 billion 
today) worth of looted gold to the SNB in 
exchange for foreign currency and materials 
vital to Germany's war effort. It also docu-
mented that gold, jewelry, coins, and dental fill-
ings of concentration camp victims were mixed 
with plundered bank gold and recycled into 
gold bullion that was traded with other neutral 
countries. After 1942, all neutrals except 
Switzerland refused to accept gold from the 
Reichsbank. The report further investigated the 
roles of all neutrals during the war, and it sup-
ported the fact that the Swiss aided the German 
war machine by exporting vital war supplies and 
providing financial services. It sharply criticized 
the Swiss bankers and government, but it also 
acknowledged failure by the United States to 
press harder for restitution after the war. 
("Switzerland and the ... ") 
In June 1997 another class-action lawsuit 
was filed in New York City on behalf of 
Holocaust victims. This time the plaintiffs con-
sisted of about 10,000 people who bought insur-
ance policies (or whose families purchased 
them) before and during the war. The claimants 
sued each of six European insurance compa-
nies, including Zurich, Winterthur, and Baliose 
of Switzerland, for $1 billion each. The 
California state government petitioned the 
main court to join the suit, claiming an esti-
mated 16,000-18,000 Holocaust survivors were 
living in the West Coast state. According to WJC 
Director Steinberg, the total value of heirless 
insurance policies exceeded that of the so-called 
Nazi gold. 
In July the SBA broke its tradition of 
secrecy and published its first list of 1,800 dor-
mant accounts that were opened by non-Swiss 
citizens prior to the end of the war. The list was 
published in several international newspapers 
and on the Internet. 
As progress was beginning to be made, 
more evidence surfaced that incriminated the 
Swiss banks. Less than a week after the SBA 
revealed the first list of accounts, newly declas-
sified United States Secret Service documents 
revealed that Canada helped the Swiss launder 
gold for the Nazis through the Portuguese cen-
tral bank. A report released through the Bank 
of Canada confirmed this by admitting that six 
tons of Nazi gold were purchased by the Swiss 
and transferred to the account of the Central 
Bank of Portugal. 
The WJC released a study in October 1997 
stating that Germany looted $8.5 billion in gold 
from 1933-45 in today's figures. It also esti-
mated that over $2 billion (also today's figures) 
of gold stolen from Jews was purchased by 
Swiss banks. It concluded that "Switzerland 
would have to pay some $2-3 billion to com-
pensate for taking looted gold." ("Switzerland 
and the ... ") The Eizenstat report had put this 
figure at $3.9 billion. The Swiss government 
rejected these findings, however, arguing that 
Switzerland's obligations to make compensa-
tion for Nazi gold matters were dissolved when 
it contributed over $58 million to the Allied 
Gold Pool in the Washington Accord of 1946. 
The real pressure began to mount on the 
Swiss from U.S. state and local governments, who 
showed their disapproval of how the banks were 
responding to the issues. Several days after the 
WJC study, UBS was barred from participating in 
a billion-dollar bond offering in New York City. 
A few days later the state of California froze all 
commercial relations with UBS, CS and SBC to 
protest the slow manner in which the banks were 
proceeding. California had engaged in about 
$2.25 billion worth of transactions with these 
banks combined in the previous 12 months. Also, 
Massachusetts ended its yearly contract with 
UBS. Over 800 state and local government offi-
cials gathered in New York to discuss how to 
increase pressure on the banks to disclose infor-
mation. (Authers and Hall, "Pressure ... ") 
The Swiss banks found themselves in a 
very difficult position. They opened up part of 
their archives under the scrutiny of the media 
to educate the public on what a large and com-
plex project was undertaken to look for dor-
mant accounts. They also explained that hun-
dreds of bank employees had been reviewing 
millions of documents over the past several 
months. A campaign to bolster their image con-
sisted of full-page advertisements in 120 inter-
national newspapers outlining the "significant 
progress" the banks had made. (Hall) While vast 
amounts of money were being spent on this 
research, a great deal was also being spent on 
public relations campaigns that would hope-
fully improve their image. Senator D'Amato 
criticized the organizations for managing to 
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spend all this money while not one Holocaust 
survivor had yet received a single payment. 
Under all this pressure the SBA published 
a new list of 14,000 dormant accounts on the 
Internet. Over 60,000 accounts were excluded 
from this list because of their nominal values, 
but their total was donated to the Red Cross. The 
value of the 14,000 accounts totaled about $12 
million. The Simon Wiesenthal Center found 
that 52 of these inactive accounts actually 
belonged to Nazi war criminals and asked the 
banks to freeze them. ("Switzerland and the ... ") 
President Bill Clinton and first lady Hillary 
Clinton hailed the Swiss banking industry for 
its efforts in shedding light on the issue of dor-
mant accounts. Also, Secretary of State 
Madeline Albright met with several members of 
the Swiss government to discuss Holocaust 
assets. This trip came in November 1997 and 
was the first time a United States Secretary of 
State had visited Switzerland in over 35 years. 
Three days later, 81 Jewish Holocaust survivors 
received the first of several payments which 
would amount to $1,000 from the Special Fund 
for Holocaust Victims. In December 1997, 23 
non-Jewish survivors (Christian and Muslim 
survivors of several Nazi concentration camps) 
also received payments from the Special Fund. 
Progress was finally being made. ("Switzerland 
and the ... ") 
The Swiss community was also launching 
private fundraising initiatives. Extreme right-
wing businessman Christoph Blocher had 
vocally opposed Villiger's idea for the Solidarity 
Foundation and began his own fund known as 
the "1998 Jubilee Collect." Blocher was able to 
raise $12 million from wealthy Swiss citizens 
and distributed it to several humanitarian orga-
nizations like the Red Cross. Socialist parlia-
ment member Gian-Reto Plattner raised over a 
million dollars and distributed the funds to 
Holocaust victims in France, Poland, the United 
States, and Switzerland. A group of Swiss high 
school students raised over $100,000 and donat-
ed part to the Israeli Organization AMCHA, 
which set up monthly allowances for Gypsy 
Holocaust survivors. ("Switzerland and the ... ") 
In May 1998 New Jersey jumped on the 
boycott bandwagon when the state legislature 
unanimously voted on a law forbidding the state 
from investing in Swiss banks or using their 
services. The boycotts, collectively applied, 
threatened billions of dollars in business for the 
banks. Leaders of Jewish organizations such as 
Edgar Bronfman, along with President Clinton 
and Stuart Eizenstat, publicly criticized these 
boycotts because they were an obstruction to 
the ongoing negotiations with the banks. Bank 
representatives retaliated by threatening to sue 
any government bodies which threatened sanc-
tions against them. The Swiss watch company 
Swatch announced it would boycott all 
American products. Denner, Switzerland's 
largest food supplier, declared it would halt the 
sale of all products imported from the United 
States. ("Switzerland and the ... ") 
In the meantime, a global settlement was 
being negotiated between the three big Swiss 
banks and Jewish organizations on behalf of the 
survivors to settle the issue of dormant 
accounts. But the Swiss National Bank refused 
to have any part in this settlement. Being a pub-
lic institution and not a commercial bank, the 
SNB argued it had no activity with private cit-
izens during WWII, eliminating the possibility 
that any dormant accounts were in its posses-
sion. (Carpozi) The real issue for the SNB was 
the Nazi gold scandal. 
In May 1998 the Independent Commission 
of Experts (the Bergier Commission) finally 
released its initial findings in a study on wartime 
gold transactions. The 200-page report con-
firmed an earlier plea by the SNB that it did not 
know that any of the gold it purchased from the 
Reichsbank was stolen from Holocaust victims. 
But the report did state that the SNB knew that 
some of the gold had been looted from banks in 
occupied countries. It estimated that the SNB 
bought gold worth $280 million (about $2.13 
billion today) from the Nazis, and that Swiss 
commercial banks absorbed about $61.2 million 
($550 million today) worth. Bergier criticized 
the SNB for never attempting to trace the ori-
gins of the gold, even though as early as 1941 
they "became increasingly aware that Jews and 
other persecuted groups were being robbed." 
Officials from the SNB argued that most of the 
gold was resmelted and stripped of its original 
identity, making it impossible to distinguish its 
origins. ("Switzerland and the ... ") 
In response to negative feedback from the 
Bergier report, the banks were anxious to settle 
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with the Jewish organizations and offered $600 
million in June 1998 to settle all claims against 
them concerning dormant accounts. The banks 
involved included UBS, CS and SBC. Even 
though the Jewish groups found this offer insult-
ingly low, it was nevertheless a major step in 
reaching a final global settlement. This figure 
included $70 million already paid out by the 
Special Fund, but did not include the fee for the 
Volcker Committee's audit for which the banks 
were responsible. The WJC hoped the Swiss gov-
ernment and the SNB would be included in the 
deal, but both parties refused to become involved. 
The SNB involuntarily became involved 
when a class-action suit was filed against it in 
the United States. The plaintiffs were Holocaust 
survivors represented by the World Jewish 
Restitution Organization. By law this case could 
potentially block access to the bank's gold 
reserves in the United States. This group of sur-
vivors was looking for $1.5 billion and was not 
linked to the case with the three big banks. 
("Switzerland and the ... ") 
Eager for a global settlement to be 
reached, Florida threatened a boycott when it 
announced in July 1998 that it would cancel its 
lines of credit with UBS and CS, worth several 
million dollars. By this time a near trade war 
was looming between the United Sates and 
Switzerland. Over 20 states and 30 cities had 
threatened to cut off business with various 
Swiss banks. 
As the clock ticked, the European Union 
finally stepped in for a brief moment. The 
European Parliament called on all EU countries 
to apply pressure on "all governments con-
cerned" regarding the dormant accounts issue. 
Switzerland was the only country specifically 
mentioned by the Parliament. 
Long-Awaited Results 
Finally in August 1998, Holocaust sur-
vivors and the Jewish organizations reached an 
agreement with the Swiss banks for $1.25 bil-
lion in reparations, more than twice as much 
as the previous offer. This figure did not include 
the Volcker Committee's fees (still undecided) 
but did include legal fees and other costs 
incurred by the banks during the settlement 
process. The settlement dissolved the three 
class-action suits filed against the banks in New 
York City, along with all other claims against 
the Swiss government and Swiss industrial 
firms. Regarding this decision, Eizenstat said: 
"In the end, we got the parties together, devel-
oped the settlement structure, and narrowed 
the differences significantly. But quite frankly 
it took Judge Korman [Eastern District of New 
York] and the threat of sanctions to get the 
banks over the top." (Cowell) 
As soon as the settlement was reached, 
interested parties were knocking at the door for 
their share. The Jewish community in Hungary 
requested $202 million from the settlement. 
The lawyers for the survivors billed $13.5 mil-
lion, not including expenses. Some of their 
invoices were found to be controversial, such 
as a bill for $2,365 for time spent reading the 
book Nazi Gold. Regardless of the settlement, 
the WJRO stated it had no plans to drop its law-
suit against the SNB. The $1.25 billion agree-
ment did not address the issue of Nazi gold, but 
the Swiss Government and the SNB refused to 
get involved. ("Switzerland and the ... ") 
During this time, progress was being 
made in the area of unclaimed insurance poli-
cies. In November, Swiss insurance companies 
Zurich, Baloise and Winterthur joined several 
other European companies to create a $90 mil-
lion humanitarian fund in favor of Holocaust 
victims. ("Switzerland and the ... ") Were the 
insurance companies learning from the experi-
ence of the banks? 
To help facilitate the return of dormant 
accounts to their rightful owners, the banks 
paid $4 million to computerize the list of dor-
mant accounts that they had previously pub-
lished. By February 1999 over 62,000 checks of 
$500 were sent out to American Holocaust sur-
vivors from the Special Fund. Survivors in 
Israel still had not received any payments 
because of the slow speed of the local bureau-
cracy. Although $59 million had been allocated 
to the Israelis, it was being held up by the 
finance committee of the Israeli parliament. 
The Special Fund also distributed $2.4 million 
to Holocaust survivors in Australia, and over 
2,600 beneficiaries in Russia received payments 
of $400 each. ("Switzerland and the ... ") 
In December 1999, the Volcker Committee 
finally released its report on the audit of the 
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Swiss banks. The three-year investigation looked 
at all accounts opened from 1933-45 and found 
53,886 accounts that may have been associated 
with the Holocaust. It advised the Swiss to pub-
lish 25,187 new names of dormant account hold-
ers that had a possible relationship with victims 
of Nazism. The SBA argued that only about 3,000 
could be effectively linked to Holocaust victims. 
Jewish organizations won this argument when 
the Volcker Committee published the entire list 
in its report. The ICEP estimated that these 
accounts were worth about $200-440 million 
today. Bank officials hoped this would bring clo-
sure to this issue in that both moral and finan-
cial justice had been achieved. 
Four days later the Bergier Commission 
published its long-awaited second report, 
"Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era," on 
Swiss refugee policy during WWII. The 350-
page study blamed anti-Semitism and a nation-
al fear of foreigners as the main reasons for 
turning away so many Jews and others seeking 
refuge at the height of the Holocaust. As the 
report stated, "Switzerland declined to help 
people in mortal danger," therefore helping the 
Nazis achieve their "final solution." But the 
report also credited the Swiss for saving 21,000 
Jews during the war, even though "a more 
humane policy might have saved thousands 
more refugees from being killed." ("Switzerland 
and the ... ") The Jewish groups, the Israeli 
Foreign Mfairs Ministry, and Eizenstat praised 
Switzerland after the publication of the report. 
But right-wing politicians in Switzerland, such 
as Christoph Blocher, feared the report could 
open the door for still more financial demands 
from the survivors. 
After months of negotiation, an agreement 
was also reached between the German govern-
ment and German industry with over 2 million 
surviving victims of the Nazi forced labor pro-
gram. The German government and 225 firms 
agreed to pay $4.9 billion into a compensation 
fund for these victims. ("Switzerland and the ... ") 
Since the $1.25 billion settlement was 
signed, several factors have retarded its 
progress. For one thing, as of May 5, 2000, no 
plan had been finalized on how to allocate and 
distribute the fund. Judah Gribetz, who had 
been appointed by Judge Korman as the "spe-
cial master" to make the final decision, received 
hundreds of suggestions from committee mem-
bers. As of now, three payments are expected to 
be made in June and November 2000 and a final 
payment in November 2001. The settlement 
defined five classes of persons considered 
"Victims or Targets of Nazi Persecution." The 
classes included claims to deposited assets, loot-
ed assets, refugees and slave labor. Heirs and 
successors to actual victims were also includ-
ed. ("Switzerland and the ... ") Another prob-
lem involves the creation of a centralized elec-
tronic database containing records for all 4.1 
million accounts opened at Swiss banks from 
1933-45. The Volcker Committee declared it 
was necessary to publish the entire list, but the 
Swiss Federal Banking Commission argued that 
only the 46,000 accounts that were identified 
as having a "probable or possible" relationship 
to Holocaust victims should be included. Credit 
Suisse and UBS (which merged with Swiss 
Bank Corp) agreed in early May 2000 to allow 
searches of 2.1 million accounts- their share 
of the 4.1 million accounts. (Beckett) This 
means that claims filed under the 1998 settle-
ment by victims, their heirs and survivors can 
be crosschecked with this extensive database. 
The American litigation and the power of 
Jewish organizations have highlighted the vul-
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nerability to external pressure of some of the 
world's most powerful banks. The banking sec-
tor experienced a rocky year in 1998, with some 
of the damage due to the delay in reaching a 
global settlement. When UBS planned a 
takeover of SBC, the merger was nearly blocked 
by United States legislation because of the 
Holocaust era assets controversy in the United 
States. After the banks successfully merged, 
UBS suffered declining profits anyway and lost 
AAA status with international rating agencies. 
("Switzerland: Review 1999") The campaign 
against them in the United States has exposed 
their vulnerability to future boycotts of their 
growing international business. 
Even with the bulk of the controversy 
behind them, Swiss banks may still fear a simi-
lar attack by legislators to water down their bank 
secrecy law and hand over information dealing 
with possible cases of tax fraud. The trademark 
bank secrecy law was again compromised in 
1999 when a law was passed that obligated banks 
to inform authorities of all suspicious transac-
tions. There is reason to be fearful because the 
Swiss banking industry's biggest competitive 
advantages are its bank secrecy laws and its 
favorable tax treatment of non-residents. 
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